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‘Before starting work I walk around it several times 
accompanied by myself’
Between 1890 and 1898 Erik Satie lived at  6 rue 
Cortot:  ‘in a wardrobe’. Satie was a collector. . . . 
After his death his wardrobe was found  to contain 
84 handkerchiefs besides 12 identical velvet suits 
and dozens of umbrellas. 
Trois  morceaux  en  forme  de  
poire  . .  
. . . three   pieces  in 
the   form of    a   pear  
 
the title of a piano piece in seven parts by Erik 
Satie. 
[Satie. Erik (Alfred Leslie). 1866-1925, French 
composer, noted for his eccentricity, experimental-
ism, and his direct and economical style  . . . ]
They are:   
manière de commencement
prolongation du même
Morceau 1
Morceau 2
Morceau 3
en plus 
redite
Satie composed this piece in response to 
Debussy’s criticism that his works lacked a ‘sense 
of form’. What exactly did Debussy mean by this? 
Where and what actually was this scene of form-
lessness? Was the quality that Debussy felt Satie’s 
music lacked  a sense of ‘historical form’? Probably 
Debussy was referring to the lack of reference to 
sonata form with its inherent experience of ‘develop-
ment’, of the experiencing of time through a series 
of interlinking episodes which would result initially in 
a ‘resolution’, and consequently a sense of ‘return-
ing’. An example would be that of Beethoven’s ‘Les 
Adieux’ sonata, whose three movements are entitled 
Le depart, L’absence and Le retour. Was he refer-
ring to more technical matters,  the arrangement of 
intervals, the minutiae of chords, of sequences, of 
‘passing notes’, of parallel fifths? Or was Debussy 
speaking in a more ‘philosophical’ sense, feeling a 
lack of a ‘raison d’être’, a lack of forward momentum 
that a particular harmonic vocabulary produces, 
hence therefore the lack of ‘form’, the lack of 
forming and its subsequent lack of ‘goals’? Satie 
parodies the notion of ‘composition’ by substitut-
ing it with ‘organisation’. An organisation of time 
with an elaborate titling of divisions. Satie seems 
to attempt to subvert the Kantian view of time as 
subservient to movement into a situation where 
movement is subordinate to time, the path of which 
no conventional figure, whether it be circle or spiral, 
can mimic. It becomes a single thread, indivisible, 
stealth-like. Satie is defying the bar-line. Time is no 
longer related to the movement which it measures, it 
is related to the time which conditions it. So the very 
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Goodman, The Salon of 1767, Site 2] and Condillac 
elaborated on in his Traité des sensations. 
                          Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715 
- 80)
You will understand how easily we are led to make 
systems if you consider that nature itself has made 
a system of our faculties, of our needs, and things 
related to us. It is in accordance with this system that 
we think; it is in accordance with this system that our 
opinions, whatever they may be, are produced and 
combined. [Traité des systèmes, in Œuvres Phil. de 
Condillac, I,  p.  216]
Sensations give birth to the whole system of man, a 
complete system all of whose parts are linked and 
mutually sustaining.  It is a sequence of truths: the 
first observations prepare the way for those that 
follow, the last confirm those that preceded them. 
[“Extrait raisonné du traité des sensations”, in 
Œuvres Phil., I, p. 325]
In his Traité des sensations and Traité des systèmes, 
one of Condillac’s stated objectives was  ‘to reduce 
to one single principle all that concerns human 
understanding’. His approach was to reconcile 
Descartes’s and Locke’s philosophies - to achieve a 
synthesis between Descartes’s ‘natural’, methodical 
reasoning and Locke’s ‘natural’ sense-data-based 
thought. In doing so Condillac aimed to combine 
the naturalness of intellectual procedures with the 
naturalness of the physical world.  Logical analysis 
could function in both mental and material worlds. 
The mind/body distinction is still maintained, other-
wise the need for analysis to bridge the gap would 
no longer be needed.
Condillac’s question, a recurring one in the 18th 
century [see in particular the ‘Molyneux Problem’ as 
described in Diderot’s Letter on the Blind] centred 
on whether the primary data received by the senses 
produce by themselves the coherent image of a 
nature of music, that is, succession, is challenged. 
This renunciation of division produces difficulties in 
the creation of necessary forms, ingredients needed 
to create contrast, repetition, reminiscence and 
memory. But though divisions create forms, these 
do not in turn necessarily have the qualities of what 
Heidegger might call ‘the thingly’, as I will discuss 
later.
Debussy’s comments on Satie’s piece open up a 
debate about the nature of form. What is meant by 
‘form’ and ‘forms’, and how do form and content or 
expression relate to each other? The argument can 
be viewed from various points. Firstly the order of 
perception versus the order of creation. Secondly 
the nature of the containing element of the notion 
of ‘form’ and the necessary oxymoron of ‘formless 
forms’. Imagine: concrete cube / wax cube: the 
form is the same but the matter is different. Plato, 
in his Theory of Forms, talks about classification, 
and also about definitions. Definitions can operate 
through comparisons. ‘Redness’ can be judged in 
terms of ‘blueness’ and ‘greenness’, nothing in the 
‘sensible’ world is beautiful or, say, large without at 
the same time having the qualities of ugliness or 
smallness. But definitions can also be judged in 
their own terms, as parts of Forms. Forms can exist 
or not exist, but not at the same time. The Theory 
of Forms concerns itself with Definitions, that is, the 
understanding of a term as distinct from its mere 
usage. The sensible world is seen in terms of oppo-
sites. But these opposites must exist separately, 
and they must have definitions. Take a word such 
as ‘Satie’. There is no opposite to ‘Satie’. But there 
is the possibility of there not being a ‘Satie’. Yet not 
at the same time: but perhaps . . . Satie. However 
Plato would only accept evidence that was ‘eternally’ 
true, i.e. not merely the result of observations of the 
world. Nothing in the sensible world could actually 
qualify as an object of knowledge. Our experience 
is founded on information collected by the senses, 
as Diderot emphasised in his Salon of 1767, [Denis 
Diderot (1713 - 84). See Diderot on Art , trans.  John 
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spiritual faculty, reason, which existed independ-
ently of the senses, though it could not function 
without the stimuli they provide. For Hobbes, man 
was regarded as matter in motion. For La Mettrie 
[in L’homme machine], man was a purely physical 
being, like an animal or a plant, and totally depend-
ent on physical sensations gathered by his senses. 
For Diderot [Lettre sur les aveugles], man’s ideas 
are relative to the senses and would be different if 
he or she were deprived of any].
The principal object of this work is to show how 
all our knowledge and all our faculties come from 
our senses, or, to speak more precisely, from our 
sensations; for in reality, the senses are only the 
occasional cause. They do not feel if it is the mind 
alone which feels through the agency of the organs; 
and it is from the sensations that modify it the mind 
draws all its knowledge and all its faculties. [Extrait 
raisoné , in Œuvres Phil., I,  p.  323]
In the Cartesian system reason is capable of devel-
opment without reference to sense experience - only 
pure thought is clear and distinct. Passions are seen 
as disturbances in a rationality that humans suffer 
as a result of having a body. Descartes’s realisation 
that we are not in direct contact with the surfaces 
of things led him to recognise that our perceptions 
take place within our minds and are made up of 
ideas, and that ideas are not the same stuff as the 
physical realities that cause them. In this he was 
perpetuating the dualism suggested by the ‘New 
Science’, and he accounted for our experience 
of a physical world by a theory of representative 
perception. Our perception of secondary qualities 
is caused by the physical attributes of things, but 
there is no necessary resemblance between them: 
in other words, the sensations we experience repre-
sent physical reality but are not identical with it. For 
Locke, thought divorced from experience did not 
exist. Reflection could not function without experi-
ence. Reflection enabled simple ideas provided by 
the senses to develop into more complicated ideas, 
physical world that we have in our consciousness, 
or whether some additional organising faculty was 
required to complete the process.
Condillac’s ‘Statue-Man’ was an attempt to create 
the hypothetical experiences a statue would undergo 
as its senses were developed one by one. Starting 
with what he thought was the least informative of 
the senses, smell, he surmised whether, without 
innate ideas, reason and reflection can prevail. He 
went on to discuss the relationship of the senses to 
each other, and the crucial role of touch and move-
ment in the awareness of the self and the discovery 
of the outside world.  Condillac observed the statue 
now with its senses and movement. Excited by 
the prospect of pain and pleasure and steered by 
the mechanism of association of ideas, the statue-
man acquired practical knowledge, formulated 
abstract ideas and developed a morality. He had 
the mental capacity of a man, limited only by his 
lack of a language and contract with humankind. 
Condillac saw the statue-man as an ideal, a model 
from which all irrelevant and extraneous factors had 
been omitted so that the essential features were 
clearly displayed. 
Nature gives us organs in order to show us by 
means of pleasure what to seek, and by means of 
pain what to avoid. But there it stops; and it leaves 
to experience the task of making us contract habits, 
and of finishing work which it has begun. This is a 
new view, and it shows the simplicity of the ways of 
the author of nature. Is it not cause for wonder that it 
was only necessary to make men sensible to pleas-
ure and pain to generate ideas, desires, habits and 
talents of every kind in him? [Traité des sensations, 
in Œuvres Phil., I,  p.  222]
Condillac’s originality is seen in his views on the 
environmental and physiological origins of person-
ality - that man is the result of the reactions of the 
sense-organs to the stimuli provided by the physi-
cal environment [for Locke, man still possessed a 
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present moment he is no longer what he has been. 
So long as there is no change, he exists without any 
reflection upon himself; but as soon as he changes, 
he judges that he is the same as he formerly was 
in another state, and he says {I}. [Traité des sensa-
tions, in Œuvres Phil., I,  p. 238]
Condillac therefore rejects Locke’s theory that one 
can perceive without knowing that one perceives. 
The Statue does not receive anything until it has 
been endowed with touch and movement. It is only 
aware of itself through change. The ‘self’, the {I} is 
the sum of its movements, its changes: there is not 
anything outside these sensations and memories. 
The next stage in the awakening of the statue is 
the discovery of the non-self, through touch and 
the revealing of its physical dimensions and limits 
[edges]. The statue is seen to have sensations, 
rather than being a sensation.
In Traité des sensations, Condillac asks if all knowl-
edge is derived from sensations. He confirms that 
we are aware of the spatial world around us, and 
are able to fit different sorts of sense-data into a 
coherent picture of the world. As we see objects, we 
see them as totalities, we do not see their various 
separate qualities first and the whole later. Condil-
lac found that none of the sensations of smell, taste, 
hearing and sight would reveal to the statue-man 
anything outside himself. Even the sensation of 
touch, if unaccompanied by movement, would not 
indicate an outside world. Tâtonnement . . . the 
vibratory continual touching and retouching that 
establishes experiential research - the ‘innocent’ 
study that requires almost no preparation of the 
soul. Both Condillac in Traité des sensations and 
Diderot in his Interprétation describe touch as the 
beginning of the process of ‘distinguishing’. For 
Condillac the touching had to be continuous. The 
statue describes ‘limit’ and ‘otherness’. The hand 
moving across a surface is mirrored by the bodies’ 
sensation of being touched. Condillac was inter-
ested in the linear logic in sensation. Diderot was 
though this was dependent on the mind’s innate 
ability to reason without experience. ‘Uneasiness’, a 
sense of discontent, of unfocused desire is the moti-
vator of all actions, the will, the determination to act. 
Reason is the servant of the will, ‘the sensitive soul 
contemplating its ideas’ and suggests the best way 
to placate this uneasiness, and to imagine the likely 
outcomes of pain and pleasure. [Descartes puts the 
will in the service of reason. The will is the source 
of error, which can only be avoided if the former 
waits on understanding and refrains from making 
judgements until the outcome is clear. The will must 
control the passions, by siding with the rational.]
Condillac saw that empiricism required an analysis 
of the mind itself and not just a knowledge of exter-
nal substances and relations. He saw desire as the 
motivating force behind the whole mind - as the root 
of both the will and understanding [Extrait raisonné, 
in  Œuvres Phil., I,  p.  325]
  . . . first ideas and experiences are sensations  . . . 
some will be less pleasant than others
resulting in uneasiness  . . . memory of the pleasant 
changes uneasiness into desire - to return to a state 
of pleasure  . . . which in turn activates love, hate 
fear etc. . . . this takes the mind beyond the mere 
recording and feeling to the heights of reason   . . . 
[Traité des sensations, in Œuvres Phil., I,  p228 ]
While the understanding provides the ideas towards 
which the will moves, the will selects the ideas that 
the understanding focuses on. It is a physical need, 
not a rational logic that decides the association of 
ideas. Condillac concludes therefore that it is need, 
not logic, that is the foundation of reason. This anal-
ysis of reason was mirrored in his analysis of the 
self [or how we get the idea of the self]. The self is 
not intuitively known - when the Statue comes alive 
it has no knowledge of itself - it can only be discov-
ered when change has occurred.
What we understand by this word {I} seems to me 
applicable only to a being who notices that in the 
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a function of the mind. It is sensations that we owe 
our development to. Condillac’s work on the Statue-
Man announced his departure from total agreement 
with Locke. Pain and pleasure looked forward to the 
mind and ultimately understanding [attention] and 
will [desire]. The nature of the will - passion, love, 
hate, fear evolve out of desire and experience in the 
same way that understanding evolves out of atten-
tion. Whereas Locke had analysed the mind as a 
static entity, Condillac looked at the activities inside 
the mind, specifically between reason and the will, 
and the will  and passion.
Plato held the view that humans understood 
eternal forms before they were born, when our 
experience of the world is purely intellectual. He 
sees Forms as being more substantial than eternal 
objects, but relates the two notions together in terms 
of hierarchies, in the sense of the archetype and 
the copy. These copies are kept in ‘space’. A divine 
artificer copies these in different places, therefore 
creating many things from the same form [printing / 
moulding / casting]
Heidegger restates and then develops Aristo-
tle’s notion of form. Take a block of granite: there 
is a form, the block, and there is the substance, 
the granite. Form determines the distribution of the 
matter in space, resulting in a particular shape. But 
with an object such as equipment [tools, say], the 
shape is not made by a prior distribution of matter: 
On the contrary, form controls the arrangement 
of the matter, and also selects the matter, and its 
arrangement. The relationship between form and 
matter is dictated by the usage, the tool-like qualities 
of the object, and this ‘usefulness’ is not something 
that can be added at the end. The ‘usefulness’ is 
paramount. A made object is self-contained, but its 
shape has not taken place by itself, like the granite. 
The tool, like the art-work, is constructed. But 
Heidegger then links these two notions by suggest-
ing that art has a ‘self-sufficient presencing’ that has 
a similarity with the granite. Tools therefore are half 
not interested in origins (which suggest laws and 
rigidity) but ways of adapting to a world in continual 
transformation. For Condillac, movement introduces 
the perception of space, ‘otherness’, and solidity. 
Statue-Man can ascertain that there are at least two 
things in the world, himself and the space around 
himself. Secondary qualities such as smell, sound 
, taste, cannot provide any knowledge of the world 
on their own, they can only function by way of an 
experience of space and movement. Statue-Man’s 
next task is learning to perceive the different sense 
organs. Through experiences of touch and move-
ment, sensations are seen to be located in the body, 
not the mind. Different sense-organs would result 
in different sensations. The final act is the Statue-
Man’s ability to relate sensation to objects, therefore 
leaving reality behind. He realises that sensations 
are in objects and not in himself, and as sensa-
tions are a mass of chaotic feelings, they are also 
capable of being transformed into a diverse range 
of utterances.
As many are our needs, so many are our different 
enjoyments, and as many are the degrees in our 
needs, so many are the degrees in our enjoyment. 
In this lies the germ of all we are, the source of our 
happiness and of our unhappiness. . . . The history 
of our Statue’s faculties makes the growth of all 
these things very clear. When it was limited to funda-
mental feeling, one uniform sensation comprised 
its whole existence, its whole knowledge, its whole 
pleasure. In giving it successively new modes of 
being and new senses, we saw it form desires, learn 
from experience to regulate and satisfy them, and 
proceed to new needs, to new knowledge, to new 
pleasures. The Statue is therefore nothing but the 
sum of all it has acquired. Why would it not be the 
same with man?  [Traité des sensations, in Œuvres 
Phil., I,  p.  314]
       
            
Condillac made a distinction between the senses, 
which belong to the body, and sensation, which is 
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in such a work, if it is a work’.
Heidegger paints, he sculpts this Temple before 
our very eyes, but at the same time as he builds 
this image, he questions its foundations, its right 
to lie on the earth. . . . This Temple in a building . 
.. it is not representational, it is not a model, it is 
not an imitation. . . . Heidegger separates the build-
ing, the form, from its function, its toolness. . . . A 
Greek Temple portrays nothing. It simply stands 
there in the middle. . . . Standing there, the building 
rests on the rocky ground. . . . The Temple’s firm 
towering makes visible the invisible space of the 
air. The Temple rests on the earth. Then Heidegger 
adjusts his position: adjusts his aspect. He resists 
the notion of the Temple coming to rest on the 
surface of the earth, but renames the surface, the 
planetary earth as the shelter earth, the earth that 
creates, supports, gives life to the arising structures 
and then gives them shelter when they return. The 
World and the Earth are contestants in this field. 
The world displays its clarity and openness, the 
earth conceals, shelters, attempts to draw the world 
into itself. The Temple straddles both worlds. The 
frontier bisects it, masking for a time its progress 
[a place of respite, the customs post]. The Temple 
work standing out there on this earth opens up a 
world and at the same time sets the world back again 
on earth. And, whereas in the case of fabricating 
equipment, e.g. an axe, the stone is used, and used 
up, disappearing into its own usefulness [and the 
material is all the better and more suitable the less 
it resists vanishing in the equipmental being of the 
equipment], the Temple does not cause the material 
to disappear. It displays it. It allows it to be seen. 
The Temple is in the earth: rises above it: descends 
back into it. It promotes, displays the earth: it allows 
the earth to speak, to be seen. The Temple presses 
downwards and shows its heaviness to the earth. 
The earth though cannot be destroyed: the earth is 
always ‘closed up’: it is ‘self-secluding’. 
The Temple. This Temple. The event of the 
art-work: they have thingliness, but they lack the 
self-sufficiency of the art-work. Tools have a posi-
tion between ‘thing’ and work.
Was Debussy therefore questioning Satie’s 
commitment to the ‘thingly’? For Heidegger, works 
are ‘things’. There is a ‘thingly’ element in works of 
art [colour in painting, stone in sculpture]. But the 
work is more than the ‘thingly’. It has an artistic 
‘nature’: the aesthetic value is superimposed on it 
by our subjective views of it. The artwork is a thing 
that is made, but it says something other than the 
‘thing’ itself, it is an allegory, a symbol [Gk, symbal-
lein - to bring together]. It is the ‘thingly’ feature of 
the work that the artist ‘makes’ by his labours. For 
in the Trois Morceaux there are ‘things’ that show 
themselves [chords, durations, timbres ] and there 
is the ‘thing in itself’ - things which do not appear 
[progressions, cadences]. Heidegger’s ‘thing’ there-
fore designates everything that is not nothing. 
This ‘thing’, this ‘form’ is something around which 
properties are assembled: the core of things [Gk. 
hypokeimenon]. For Heidegger the core was some-
thing at ground level, the plan. It is these properties 
such as colour and texture that give things their 
consistency and quintessence, their sensuousness. 
This matter is encapsulated in the ‘Form’. The Form 
has a consistency of matter: it is formed matter: it 
is what we see in something. But this thing-concept 
applies to nature and tools, not to Art. The thingly 
element in Art is the matter of which it consists.
The ‘mere thing’ has its quality of self-containment. 
‘Equipment’ has both the qualities of self-contain-
ment and specific use. But the Artwork has neither 
of these qualities. By its very nature its boundaries 
lack self-conviction and its lack of ‘specific use’ is 
ingrained in its own texture, grain.
Heidegger then asks the question ‘With what 
essence of what thing should a Greek Temple 
agree?’ and follows this with, ‘Who could maintain 
the impossible view that the Idea of Temple is repre-
sented in the building? And yet, truth is set to work 
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provokes the narrative and lets in the possibilities of 
the image. It is limited, it is inside itself, there is no 
place for itself outside the process. The pleasure of 
this recalling. The pleasure of the grain. Disclosing, 
unfolding and lastly, obsolescent in its waiting, the 
Old French desveloper - to unwrap, to reveal, layer 
by layer the imitation, the mimicry, the counterfeit. . 
. . To paraphrase Nauman: 
The master is formed the image is mastered. 
The form is mastered the master is imagined.
. . . the transcript, abundance and hence power, 
wealth. Abundant becomes copious. Rich begets 
opulence. Copious; copyist; copyright - the exclu-
sive right to copy; this copying between ‘art’ and 
‘life’ - reality by exclusion. They do not encourage 
meanings, they enjoy descriptions. Explanation is 
stupidity, and stupidity is their belief in explanation. 
Knowledge is only valued by its inherent banality 
and practical uselessness. 
Objects too have an inherent stupidity. They 
have no organisation, only order/disorder. They 
have presence, but they prove nothing. Lists exude 
authority: the possible privileges resulting from 
inclusion, the possible disaster of omission. Lists 
suggest realism, they point metaphor to the extrem-
ities, they provide a set of pieces for the ‘audience’ 
to move around without any preconditions or expec-
tations. These lists slow down the narrative, at 
times to the point where the names are becalmed 
in a mirror image of themselves; extremes to not 
meet in some dramatic mêlée, they rather cancel 
each other out. This attention to details, minutiae, 
categories, parallels that of the abortive suicide who 
wishes so much to be seen to want to die. Flau-
bert allows ‘little’ metaphors to develop inside these 
listings: ‘in the real world distinctions have little 
force, it is a literary deceit that they do’, and it is 
in these little metaphors that the pairs are born. As 
time begins to falter, the reader/observer begins to 
write their own sub-lists, to rearrange things, say, 
Temple. The Temple in motion. Heidegger talks 
about motion: rest is the opposite of motion and 
only what is in [has been] in motion can rest. Rest 
can include motion: there is a rest which includes an 
inner concentration of motion, inside of which exist a 
multiplicity and variety of inflections which produce 
‘events’ or ‘vibrations’ with an infinity of harmonics 
or submultiples. These do not move to a rational or 
‘philosophical’ plan, but they radiate and dissemi-
nate in a topography of experience composed 
of units that are neither logical or organic, that is, 
neither based upon pieces as a long unity or a frag-
mented totality; nor formed or prefigured by those 
units in the course of a logical development or of an 
organic evolution.
Let us return to the subject of hierarchies, in the 
sense of the archetype and the copy. These copies 
are kept in ‘space’. A divine artificer copies these 
in different places, therefore creating many things 
from the same form [printing / moulding / casting 
] .  . . and, eventually . . . cliché‚ . . . overexposure 
/ the trite / the stereotype [C19: from the French, 
from clicher to stereotype; imitative of the sound 
made by the matrix when it is dropped into molten 
metal]. The making of the ‘master’, either through 
the cutting [the actual cutting] through of the metal 
or by the dissolving [etching, dissolution] in the 
acid. The master is formed, or the form [image] 
is mastered. Alloy, zinc, lead, leather, rubber, the 
image if formed through these. The developing 
process [a misnomer: the process only offers a 
change in circumstance], a process of a chemical 
development mirrors perhaps Satie’s non-devel-
opmental compositional processes. Both in black 
and white, blanc et noir, the double negative. As 
the chemicals attack the paper surface [seen/scene 
in/of red light] the image comes into physical and 
visual being simultaneously. The hardness or soft-
ness of the grain [the conduit of the grain as the 
grain pours through the differences]. This graini-
ness, this process of gradual surface deterioration 
destroys the naturalness and the absence of time 
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Satie elaborated on this idea in a note to Jean 
Cocteau: ‘Furniture music for law offices, banks, 
etc.... No marriage ceremony without furniture 
music.... Don’t enter a house which does not have 
furniture music.
Furniture Music’s premiere was a disaster. People 
insisted on actually listening to it. Satie was furious; 
he and fellow composer Darius Milhaud urged the 
audience to take no notice of the music and to 
behave as if it did not exist. 
The music ... wishes to make a contribution to life 
in the same way as a private conversation, a paint-
ing ... or a chair on which you may or may not be 
seated. 
Milhaud later recounted: 
It was no use Satie shouting: ‘Talk for heaven’s 
sake! Move around! Don’t listen!’ They kept quiet. 
They listened. The whole thing went wrong. 
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alphabetically [encyclopaedia], temporally, in terms 
of colour, texture, politics. Listings turn out to be 
arbitrary in their very earnestness. This splitting-up 
of otherwise rational events deprives objects of their 
meaning and creates an atmosphere of uncertainty 
and suspicion, justified by pointless acts of organi-
sation. And as we strip away the meaning from the 
signs we set the objects free and leave openings, 
fissures, where the [common-place] becomes the 
emblematic - a notion which Debussy found prob-
lematic in the extreme.
Before starting work I walk around it several times 
accompanied by myself.
Between 1890 and 1898 Erik Satie lived at 6 Rue 
Cortot: ‘in a wardrobe’. Satie was also a collector. . . 
. After his death his wardrobe was found to contain 
84 handkerchiefs besides 12 identical velvet suits 
and dozens of umbrellas. For the last 27 years of 
his life he lived in an apartment in Arceuil.
[BEDROOM, BACHELOR’S. Always untidy, 
with women’s whatsits left around. Smell of 
cigarettes. There must be some bizarre things 
hidden away there.]
Satie created Musique d’ameublement [Furniture 
Music] as music that was not to be listened to, 
and to distinguish background music from ‘serious’ 
music. He said, 
You know, there’s a need to create furniture music, 
that is to say, music that would be a part of the 
surrounding noises and that would take them into 
account, as masking the clatter of knives and forks 
without drowning it completely, without imposing 
itself. It would fill up the awkward silences that occa-
sionally descend on guests. It would spare them the 
usual banalities. Moreover, it would neutralise the 
street noises that indiscreetly force themselves into 
the picture. 
